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Hotel Asset and Equity Risk before, during, and after the Global Financial Crisis
Marilyn F. Johnson, Mark S. Johnson, and Antoinette C. Tessmer
Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI

ABSTRACT

In this paper, we use asset betas and equity betas over the period January 2000 through December
2015 to investigate the operating and financial risk of hotel industry REITs and C-Corps. We conclude
that, on average over our sample period, the operating risk of C-Corps exceeds that of REITs. One
interpretation of this result is that management contracts between REITs and C-Corps allocate more
operating risk to C-Corps than to REITs. We also find that, on average, during our sample period, the
equity betas of C-Corps exceed those of REITs. However, the difference between the average equity
risk of the two sectors is much smaller than the sectors’ difference in operating risk. Because equity
betas capture both operating and financial risk, these results imply that REITs have significantly less
operating risk than C-Corps and offset their lower business risk with higher financial leverage. During
the global financial crisis, operating risk increases in both hotel industry subsectors, and the amount
by which C-Corp asset betas exceed REIT asset betas is roughly proportionate to that observed in
noncrisis periods. During the financial crisis, however, REITs experienced a greater increase in financial leverage than did C-Corps, with the result being that the normal relation reverses, i.e., during the
global financial crisis, REIT average equity betas significantly exceeded the average equity betas of
C-Corps.
Key words: Hotel REITs, Hotel C-Corps, Systematic Risk, Asset Risk

1.0 Introduction
Our paper provides empirical evidence on the operating risk and financial risk of hotel-industry REITs
and C-Corps before, during, and after the financial
crisis. Our study is motivated by the fact that policy
analysts disagree about the allocation of operating
risk in the hotel industry. Eyster and deRoos (2009)
argue that REITs bear a higher level of hotel operating risk than C-Corps because of the inherent risk
in owning property as well as the fact that C-Corps
have greater bargaining power than REITs in setting the terms of management contracts. In contrast, Latter and O’Brien (2007) imply that the total
return to REITs and C-Corps will be maximized if
management contracts transfer operating risk from
REITs to C-Corps, thereby allowing REITs to better
capitalize on their comparative advantage in bearing
financial risk.

Our study is also motivated by a desire to better understand the impact of the global financial
crisis of 2007–2010 on the operating and financial
risk of hotel REITs and hotel C-Corps. The financial crisis revealed general problems with the bifurcation of real estate and operations, i.e., the Opco/
Propco structure. Operating companies in industry
segments such as healthcare and food and beverage
experienced severe financial distress, the magnitude
of which was not experienced by hotel C-Corps. Yet,
the global financial crisis of 2007–2010 undoubtedly
resulted in an increase in hotel industry operating
risk and financial risk, implying that an examination
of changes in the relative amounts of operating and
financial risk borne by REITs and C-Corps through
time is warranted.
Prior research on risk in the hotel industry examines CAPM equity betas or equity betas derived from
the Fama-French (1993) three-factor model (see,
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e.g., Kim & Jang, 2012; Choudry, 2005; Philippas,
Economou, Babalos, & Kostakis, 2013). Equity betas
capture a stock’s co-movement with market returns
and reflect both a firm’s operating risk, which varies with fundamentals such as the firm’s operating
leverage, sales volatility, and competitive environment, and its financial risk, which varies with interest rates and the amount of debt in the firm’s capital
structure (Ross, Westerfield, Jaffe, & Jordan, 2019).
Because equity betas capture both operating and
financial risk, it is not possible to draw inferences
about the allocation of operating risk from an analysis that focuses solely on equity betas. Nor is it possible to draw inferences about changing financial risk
from a measure that aggregates the two types of risk.
To get around this problem, we analyze both equity
and asset betas. Asset betas, which are the result of
adjusting CAPM equity betas for financial leverage,
are a pure measure of operating risk. By examining
patterns in both equity and asset betas, we are able
to draw inferences about both types of risk.
Accordingly, we conduct a longitudinal analysis
of the equity betas and asset betas of publicly traded
hotel Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) and
hotel C-Corps. Our sample consists of 18 REITS
and 13 C-Corps over the period 2000–2015. We
analyze CAPM equity betas as well as CAPM asset
betas, which are the betas that result when CAPM
equity betas are adjusted for financial risk. We also
conduct sensitivity analysis that examines whether
our inferences about equity betas hold when the
Fama-French (1993) three-factor model is used to
calculate equity betas.
We find that over our entire sample period, the
average C-Corp equity beta, 1.116, exceeds the average REIT equity beta, 1.021. In addition, the average
asset beta of a C-Corp, 0.823, significantly exceeds
that of a REIT, 0.468. Since asset betas measure operating risk, we conclude that the operating risk borne
by C-Corps significantly exceeds that of REITs. In
contrast, the difference between C-Corp and REIT
equity betas is much smaller, consistent with REITs
having greater financial leverage than C-Corps.
We also present evidence about changes in risk
during the financial crisis. In contrast to the results
for the entire sample period, the average C-Corp
equity beta during the financial crisis, 1.540, is significantly less than the average REIT equity beta,
1.856. However, the normal relation between asset
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betas of C-Corps and REITs holds during the financial crisis, in that the average C-Corp asset beta,
0.912, exceeds the average REIT asset beta, 0.549.
Thus, C-Corps continued to bear greater operating
risk than REITs during the financial crisis. The fact
that the average REIT equity beta during the financial crisis exceeded the average C-Corp equity beta,
but the average REIT asset beta during the financial crisis is less than the average C-Corp asset beta,
implies that during the financial crisis, there was a
proportionately larger increase in the financial risk
of REITs than of C-Corps. As a result, the normal
relation between equity betas of REITs and C-Corps
is reversed. We also examine the sensitivity of our
CAPM equity beta results to use of the Fama-French
(1993) three-factor model. Our inferences about
C-Corp and REIT sensitivity to market risk are
not altered. We do not examine asset betas because
there is no three-factor analog to CAPM asset betas.
Our study makes several contributions to the literature. Most importantly, we are the first to empirically examine asset betas of REITs and C-Corps and
are thus able to draw inferences about the allocation of operating risk in the hotel industry. We find
that the average asset betas of the C-Corps in our
sample exceed those of our sample REITs and that
the magnitude of this difference in operating risk
between the two hotel subsectors is relatively constant through time. From this evidence, we infer
that management contracts between REITs and
C-Corps are structured such that relatively more of
the industry’s operating risk is borne by C-Corps.
Evidence on the average allocation of operating risk
is of interest to hotel managers and others involved
in the negotiation of management contracts.
Second, our evidence shows that over our 2000–
2015 sample period, the average equity betas of
C-Corps exceed those of REITs. This implies that
the higher financial risk of REITs (i.e., the average
REIT has higher financial leverage than the average
C-Corp) does not fully offset their lower business
risk. Here, our conclusion contrasts with that of Kim
and Jang (2012), whose examination of the equity
betas of REITs and C-Corps concludes that there is
no difference in the average equity risk of the hotel
industry subsectors. The Kim and Jang study predates ours by six years. Thus, we have the advantage
of a longer time period that is less influenced by the
global financial crisis.
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Third, our examination of equity betas during the
financial crisis enhances our understanding of the
risk borne by REIT investors. REITs allow investors to
diversify into real estate without illiquid investments
in real property. REITs are often argued to protect
investors during stock market downturns (Simon &
Ng, 2009). Evidence that during the financial crisis,
proportionate and absolute increases in the equity
betas of hotel REITs exceeded those of hotel C-Corps
suggests that in contrast to the industry overall, hotel
REITs do not provide such protection when compared with investments in hotel C-Corps.
Finally, our evidence provides insight into the
likely impact of future financial crises on the hotel
industry. As Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) state:
“While each financial crisis is no doubt distinct, they
also share striking similarities in the run-up of asset
prices, in debt accumulation, in growth patterns,
and in current account deficits.” Financial crises
such as we saw in 2007–2010 have occurred in the
past and are likely to occur again in the future. Thus,
our paper provides investors with a likely roadmap
for the next financial crisis.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows.
Section 2 discusses financial risk concepts used in
our subsequent analysis. Section 3 develops our
hypotheses. Section 4 explains our method, and
Section 5 presents our results. We offer concluding
remarks in Section 6.
2.0 Financial risk concepts
Finance theory views risk from the perspective of
a well-diversified investor, so defines relevant risk
as the firm’s exposure to market risk. This risk is
referred to as the firm’s equity beta and is captured
by the degree to which the firm’s returns co-vary
with the returns on the market. Specifically, a firm’s
equity beta is the slope coefficient from a regression
of the firm’s return on the market return:
Rit = αi + βiRmt + eit

(1)

where:
Rit
αi
βi
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is the return for the ith hotel firm on day t,
is the intercept for the ith hotel firm,
is the slope coefficient for the ith hotel firm,
i.e., firm i’s equity beta,

61

Rmt is the return on an equal-weighted market
portfolio on day t, and
eit is the error term with mean zero.
A firm’s exposure to market risk, in turn, is determined by the firm’s operating risk and the firm’s
financial risk. The higher either of these two risks,
the higher will be the firm’s exposure to market
risk (Ross et al., 2019, p. 405–407). Operating risk
reflects a wide variety of factors that include but
are not limited to: the volatility of the firm’s sales,
the firm’s operating leverage (i.e., the degree of
fixed costs in the firm’s cost structure), the overall
economic climate in the markets in which the firm
operates, and the political and regulatory environment facing the firm and its industry. For example,
the more a company’s sales vary with the business
cycle (due to, e.g., the capital-intensity of the firm’s
industry or the discretionary purchase nature of the
firm’s products), the higher will be its operating risk.
Financial risk refers to the amount of debt in the
firm’s capital structure and the firm’s cost of debt.
Other things equal, the higher the firm’s financial
leverage, the higher will be the firm’s market risk.
Intuitively, relative to an equity financed firm, firms
with debt financing will report higher income during
economic expansions and lower income during
economic downturns. In other words, required
debt payments increase the variance in net income
because debt payments are fixed, i.e., do not vary
with the firm’s revenue and operating profit.
A firm’s equity beta can be adjusted for the firm’s
financial leverage to yield an estimate of the beta the
firm would have if it had no debt. These unlevered
betas reflect only the firm’s operating risk and are
referred to as asset betas. By definition, a firm’s asset
beta is the weighted sum of its equity beta and its
debt beta, implying the following general equation
for calculation of an asset beta:
β asset, i = (E/(E + D)) βequity, i + (D/(E + D)) βdebt, i (2)
where:
βasset, i is the weighted average co-movement of
firm i’s debt and equity securities with the
market,
βequity, i is the co-movement of firm i’s common
equity with the market,
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βdebt, i is the co-movement of firm i’s debt with
the market,
D
is the market value of firm i’s long-term
debt, and
E
is the market value of firm i’s common
stock.
In summary, finance professionals use the co-
movement of a firm’s stock returns with market
returns to measure firm risk that is relevant to well-
diversified investors. This risk is measured by the
firm’s equity beta. A firm’s equity beta is determined
by the riskiness of both the firm’s operations and
the firm’s financing. In contrast, a firm’s asset beta is
determined solely by the firm’s operating risk.
3.0 Hypothesis development
In this section, we develop two hypotheses. The
first hypothesis explores the relative operating risk
of REITs and C-Corps, while the second hypothesis examines how the operating risk of REITs and
C-Corps changes during the financial crisis. Our
hypotheses are preceeded by a literature review.
3.1 Literature review

Several prior studies examine market (i.e., equity
beta) risk and returns in the REIT industry. The
paper most relevant to our study is Kim and Jang
(2012), who examine the risk-return characteristics
and performance of hotel REITs and C-Corps. Their
focus is on an analysis of the two groups of firms
from the perspective of an investor constructing a
well-diversified portfolio. Using both the CAPM
and Fama-French (1993) three-factor model, the
authors conclude that there is no significant difference in the equity risk-return profile of the two
groups of firms and that the performance of both
groups is similar to that of the overall market.
Research prior to Kim and Jang (2012) focuses on
the REIT industry as a whole, with the goal of understanding whether the risk profile of a REIT investment parallels that of a private real estate investment.
Gilberto (1990), Gyourko and Keim (1992), and
Pagliari, Scherer, and Monopoli (2005) present evidence consistent with the argument that the return
on a REIT investment should be similar to the return
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on private real estate because a divergence in the
returns on the two investments implies an arbitrage
opportunity. In contrast, others argue that there are
significant differences in the returns between the two
groups because REIT values are determined not only
by the value of the underlying real estate but also by
tax benefits and management contracts with operating companies. Consistent with both arguments,
empirical evidence suggests REITs should be viewed
as hybrid securities (Anderson, Clayton, Mackinnon, & Sharma, 2005; Ling & Naranjo, 1999). Finally,
Kim and Jang (2012, p. 597) conclude their review of
the literature by stating that “the relative importance
of real estate and stock market factors in explaining REIT returns seems to vary over time, while the
direction of the change is mixed.”
Our study contributes to the prior literature
in two respects. First, consistent with a focus on
returns to equity investors in REITs, the prior literature examines market risk measures that reflect an
aggregation of operating and financial risk. In contrast, our focus is on understanding risk from the
perspective of a party to a management contract.
Accordingly, we examine both equity and asset
betas, which allows us to test hypotheses about the
relative allocation of operating and financial risk
between hotel REITs and hotel C-Corps. Second,
the prior literature documents changes in risk over
time. Our sample period includes the 2010s, a time
period not examined by prior research.
3.2 Hypotheses about average asset and equity
betas of REITs and C-Corps

The hotel industry includes REITs, Taxable REIT
Subsidiaries (TRSs), C-Corps, and franchise companies. REITs are pass-through entities that avoid
federal taxation at the corporate level if at least 90%
of earnings are paid out in dividends. Because of
their tax-
advantaged status, REITs typically own
hotel properties that they rent to their wholly-
owned TRSs. The creation of a TRS caps the parent
REIT’s liability, increases its borrowing capacity, and
reduces its cost of funds (Latter & O’Brien, 2007).
The TRS pays a fixed fee to the REIT and signs a
contract with a management company, which is
typically a C-
Corp or a franchise company. In
other words, a TRS is a swap machine that converts
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variable hotel revenues and costs into a fixed rental
stream for the parent REIT.
Jensen and Meckling (1976) describe the firm as
a nexus of contracts, and Scholes et al. (2014) point
out that business contracts will be structured to
maximize the joint return to all parties to the contract. One of the most important contracts in the
hotel industry is the management contract between
the REIT (through its TRS) and the C-Corp or franchise company. Because management contracts
have the potential to shift risk and return between
the parties to the contract, the profitability of a REIT
is not solely dependent on the quality of the assets it
owns, and the profitability of a C-Corp is not solely
dependent on its operating efficiency. The profitability of both entities is also dependent on the terms of
the management contract.
Eyster and deRoos (2009) discuss management
contracts between owners (e.g., REITs) and management companies (e.g., C-
Corps) in the hotel
industry. Indicative of contract complexity, the two
contract examples they provide are 44 pages and 75
pages long, respectively. Eyster and deRoos argue
that the majority of hotel operating risk is born by
the property owner. However, they state: “It should
be noted that risks are shared according to the relative bargaining strengths of the two parties and
each party’s ability to negotiate effectively: risks can
therefore be redistributed during contract negotiations” (p. 10). Additionally, they argue that both
parties seek risk minimization when they negotiate
(p. 173). They further note that since the late 1990s
and into the 2000s, “operations companies have had
more bargaining power in contract negotiations
than have property companies” (p. 38).
In summary, Eyster and deRoos (2009) point out
that the inherent operating risk of REITs exceeds
that of C-Corps and that C-Corps have bargaining power relative to REITs. In contrast, Latter and
O’Brien (2007) imply that the total return to a management contract will be maximized if some REIT
operating risk is transferred to C-Corps, thereby
allowing REITs to capitalize on their comparative
advantage in accessing debt markets. Thus, policy
analysts disagree about the relative magnitude of
the operating risk borne by REITs and C-Corps.
Accordingly, we offer the following two-sided prediction (stated in null form):
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Hypothesis 1a: Over the sample period, the
average asset beta of REITs equals the average
asset beta of C-Corps.
Equity risk includes both operating risk and financial risk. Kim and Jang (2012) examine the relative
equity risk of REITs and C-Corps over the period
2000–2009 and conclude that there is no difference
in the risk borne by investors in the two hotel industry subsectors. However, the results of Kim and Jang
may be confounded by the fact that the global financial crisis, when many hotel firms were near or in
financial distress, spans approximately one-half of
their sample period. For completeness, we also test
the following two-sided hypothesis (stated in null
form) examined by Kim and Jang (2012):
Hypothesis 1b: Over the sample period, the
average equity beta of REITs equals the
average equity beta of C-Corps.
3.3 Hypotheses about average asset and equity
betas of REITs and C-Corps during the financial
crisis

The global financial crisis is considered the worst
financial crisis since the Great Depression (Temin,
2010). It began with the collapse of the subprime
mortgage market in the United States and developed
into an international banking crisis with the September 15, 2008, collapse of Lehman Brothers (Williams, 2010). Despite various regulatory reforms
and large government bail-outs of financial institutions in the United States, the crisis was nonetheless
followed by a global economic downturn referred to
as the Great Recession. We refer to the financial crisis and the ensuing recession as the global financial
crisis.
During the global financial crisis, the operating risk of firms in the hotel industry significantly
increased as revenue from lodging, food service,
and events significantly declined. As Pizam (2009)
explains, the decline is attributable not only to fewer
retail and conference customers but also to a significant decline in average expenditures per customer.
Even affluent customers reduced expenditures by
purchasing lower-priced versions of the products
and services that they had typically purchased
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before the crisis. The impact of this increase in operating risk is an increase in the asset betas of both
REITs and C-Corps. The relative impact on these
two industry subsectors will depend on the terms of
the management contract and whether those terms
are renegotiated in response to the crisis. Thus, the
relative magnitude of the business risk borne by
REITs and C-Corps during the financial crisis is also
an open question. Accordingly, we again offer a two-
sided prediction (stated in null form):
Hypothesis 2a: During the global financial crisis,
the average asset beta of REITs equals the
average asset beta of C-Corps.
Associated with an increase in business risk
during the global financial crisis is a decline in commercial property values. Figure 1 displays commercial property returns over the period 2000–2015, as
measured by the annual percent change in Green
Street’s Commercial Property Price Index (Green
Street Advisors, 2018). The annual percent change
declines in 2007 and is negative in 2008 and 2009.
Recovery started occurring in 2010. A decline in
asset values implies a decline in equity values. Thus,
financial risk also increased during the Global Financial Crisis because declines in the market value of
hotel firms’ assets imply declines in the market value
of equity and significant increases in market-based
debt-to-equity or debt-to-assets ratios.
Figure 2 displays the average beginning of year
value of long-
term debt relative to the market
value of common stock for publicly traded REITs
and C-Corps in the United States, as derived from

COMPUSTAT data. For an ideal measure of financial leverage, both the equity value and the debt value
should be market values. However, we use the book
value of debt because under U.S. GAAP, most debt
securities are valued at fair value, which approximates market value. For equity, a market value is
easily obtainable as the beginning of year price multiplied by the number of shares outstanding. Figure 2 indicates that the global financial crisis had a
larger impact on the financial leverage of REITs than
on the financial leverage of C-Corps. These leverage
effects imply that in response to the financial crisis,
there will be a larger increase in the equity betas of
REITs than of C-Corps. Whether equity betas of
REITs will exceed those of C-Corps also depends
on the relative magnitude of equity risk in the two
sub-sectors prior to the crisis. Thus, we again offer a
two-sided prediction (stated in null form):
Hypothesis 2b: During the global financial crisis,
the average equity beta of REITs equals the
average equity beta of C-Corps.
4.0 Sample and study design
Our sample consists of 31 U.S.-based publicly traded
C-Corps and REITs in SIC code 7011 for which at
least four years of Center for Research in Security
Prices (CRSP) stock price data is available during
the sample period 2000–
2015. CRSP coverage
includes firms that are traded on the NYSE, AMEX,
or NASDAQ. A list of sample firms is provided in
Table 1. Panel A of the table provides firm names
and data availability and Panel B summarizes the

Figure 1. Year to year percent change in Green Street’s Commercial Property Price Index.
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Figure 2. Market leverage of REITs versus C-Corps from January 3, 2000 to December 31, 2015.
Note: Financial leverage = book value of long-term debt / market value of equity; book value of debt is used as a proxy for
the market value of debt since market values are not available for most firms. Shaded area represents the financial crisis
decline and recovery.

number of firms with available data each year. Of
the 31 publicly traded hotel firms, 18 are REITs and
13 are C-Corps. An examination of Table 1 Panels A
and B reveals that several firms come into and out of
the sample during our 16-year sample period. This
occurs as firms enter or exit the hotel industry, go

private, or conduct an IPO. We include firms even
if a full 16 years of data is not available to avoid survivorship bias. In other words, we want conclusions
about risk in the hotel industry to reflect the typical
firm in the industry, as opposed to only successful
firms that survived the entire period.

Table 1. Sample Description
Panel A
Firms in the sample listed by REIT versus C-Corp and dates for which data is available
TICKER

Company Name

HOST
MGMG
INN
RLJ
HST
MCS
MCRI
FCH
CDOR
HPT
MHX
MTN
GET
CHH
LQI
MAR
IHR
HT
AHT
SHR
SHO
WOLF
LVS
SOHO
DRH
MHGC
HOT

American Properties, Inc.
MGM Grand, Inc.
Summit Hotel Properties, Inc.
RLJ Lodging Trust
Host Hotels & Resorts, Inc.
Marcus Corp.
Monarch Casino & Resort, Inc.
Felcor Lodging Trust, Inc.
Condor Hospitality Trust, Inc.
Hospitality Properties Trust
Meristar Hospitality Corp.
Vail Resorts, Inc.
Gaylord Entertainment Co. New
Choice Hotels International, Inc.
La Quinta Properties, Inc.
Marriott International Inc. New
Interstate Hotels & Resorts, Inc.
Hersha Hospitality Trust
Ashford Hospitality Trust
Strategic Hotel Capital, Inc.
Sunstone Hotel Investors, Inc. NE
Great Wolf Resorts, Inc.
Las Vegas Sands Corp.
Sotherly Hotels, Inc.
Diamondback Hospitality Co.
Morgans Hotel Group Co.
Starwood Hotels & Rest Wldwd Inc.

Class

PermNo

Date In

Date Out

REIT
C-Corp
REIT
REIT
REIT
C-Corp
C-Corp
REIT
REIT
REIT
REIT
C-Corp
REIT
C-Corp
REIT
C-Corp
C-Corp
REIT
REIT
REIT
REIT
C-Corp
C-Corp
REIT
REIT
C-Corp
C-Corp

11358
11891
12566
12756
46703
51423
79507
80747
81087
81917
83718
84588
85426
85517
85619
85913
86226
86563
89803
90217
90394
90491
90505
90506
90680
91096
91207

1/1/2000
1/1/2000
1/1/2011
1/1/2011
1/1/2000
1/1/2006
1/1/2000
1/1/2000
1/1/2000
1/1/2000
1/1/2000
1/1/2003
1/1/2000
1/1/2000
1/1/2000
1/1/2003
1/1/2000
1/1/2000
1/1/2004
1/1/2004
1/1/2004
1/1/2004
1/1/2004
1/1/2004
1/1/2005
1/1/2006
1/1/2000

12/31/2004
12/31/2015
12/31/2015
12/31/2015
12/31/2015
12/31/2015
12/31/2015
12/31/2015
12/31/2015
12/31/2015
12/31/2015
12/31/2015
12/31/2015
12/31/2015
12/31/2004
12/31/2015
12/31/2008
12/31/2015
12/31/2015
12/31/2014
12/31/2015
12/31/2011
12/31/2015
12/31/2015
12/31/2015
12/31/2015
12/31/2015
(continued)
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Table 1. Sample Description (continued)
Panel A
Firms in the sample listed by REIT versus C-Corp and dates for which data is available
TICKER

Company Name

H
PEB
CLDT

Hyatt Hotels Corp.
Pebblebrook Hotel Trust
Chatham Lodging Trust

Class

PermNo

Date In

Date Out

C-Corp
REIT
REIT

93098
93178
93314

1/1/2009
1/1/2010
1/1/2010

12/31/2015
12/31/2015
12/31/2015

Note: All REITs are Propcos. The C-Corp, Interstate Hotels and Resorts, is a pure Opco. Choice Hotels International is a franchise company,
a type of C-Corp in which the corporation franchises the property and provides some management services. Since Choice Hotels provides
some of the management services and expertise but does not own properties it is a specialized type of Opco. The remaining C-Corps listed
above manage hotels and to a greater or lesser degree own some hotel properties.

Panel B
Number of firms in the sample listed by REITs, C-Corps, and total by year
Year
2000–2002
2003
2004
2005
2006–2008
2009
2010
2011
2012–2014
2015

REITs

C-Corps

Total

9
9
13
12
11
11
13
15
15
14

5
7
9
9
11
12
12
12
11
11

14
16
22
21
22
23
25
27
26
25

4.1 Definition of the financial crisis

To test our second set of hypotheses about the
impact of the global financial crisis on the risk of
hotel REITs and hotel C-Corps, we need to identify
the time period spanned by the crisis. Any definition will be somewhat arbitrary. We base our definition on a statistical analysis of the monthly Green
Street Commercial Real Estate Price Index. A statistical analysis of the monthly commercial price
index over the period 2000 to 2015 reveals that the
mean percent change (standard deviation) in the
index is 0.412% (1.724%). A 90% confidence interval around the mean is +3.2% to −2.42%. Based
upon these calculations and a visual appraisal of the
data, we define any monthly change of 3% or more,
in absolute value, to indicate that we are in either
the initial decline or recovery phase of the crisis.
This leads to a definition of the crisis as starting
in June 2008 and the recovery continuing through
April 2010.
4.2 Measurement of equity betas and asset betas

Equity betas change over time with changes in the
firm’s operating and financial risk. Accordingly, we
apply Equation 1 to estimate firm-specific equity
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betas using rolling windows. We begin on day 1 of
our sample period, using day 1 stock returns and
returns for the previous 254 trading days to estimate
firm i’s equity beta on day 1. The process of beta estimation is repeated for firm i on day 2, and so on. The
result is a time series of equity betas for each firm,
for any day on which that day and the previous 254
days of returns are available.
To compute asset betas, we apply Equation 2,
which tells us that a firm’s asset beta is the weighted
sum of its equity and debt betas. In our study the
amount of debt, D, is proxied by the book value of
debt at the end of the year closest to, but preceding
the first day of, the equity beta estimation period.
E is number of common shares outstanding multiplied by the beginning of year price of firm i’s common stock in the year closest to, but preceding the
first day of, the equity beta estimation period. We
assume that the firm’s debt does not strongly co-
move with the market. If we assume that βdebt is zero,
then Equation 2 reduces to:
βassets = βequity / (1 + D/E)

(3)

This equation is appropriate for REITs in our sample
because REITs pay no federal taxes. Hence, we use
Equation 3 to unlever REIT equity betas.
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We take a slightly different approach for C-Corps
because C-Corps are taxed by the federal government. If we introduce the idea that debt interest
payments are a tax-deductible expense and tc is the
firm’s marginal corporate tax rate, then:
βassets = βequity / (1 + (1 − tc)D/E)

(4)

We assume that all C-Corps face the same corporate tax rate of 34%. Using this assumption, we then
apply Equation 4 to unlever the equity betas of our
sample C-Corps.
To form portfolios, we begin by dividing the sample into two groups consisting of hotel REITs and
hotel C-Corps. We compute equal-weighted REIT
portfolio equity (asset) betas for each day by averaging the individual firm equity (asset) betas available on that day. Similar computations are made on
each day for all of the C-Corps. These average equity
and asset betas are then used to test for differences
between the two groups over the entire time period
and during the global financial crisis.
5.0 Results
This section provides the results of the analysis.
Section 5.1 compares the asset betas of REITs with
those of C-Corps over the entire sample (Hypothesis
1a) and during the financial crisis (Hypothesis 2a).
Section 5.2 compares the equity betas of REITs with
those of C-Corps over the entire sample (Hypothesis
1b) and during the financial crisis (Hypothesis 2b).
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Section 5.3 presents sensitivity analysis using the
Fama-French (1993) three-factor model. Throughout Sections 5.2 and 5.3, we use parametric t-tests
and non-parametric Wilcoxon Signed Rank tests
to analyze our hypotheses. We discuss the t-stats in
the body of the paper. Inferences from the Wilcoxon
Signed Rank tests are reported in the tables and are
qualitatively similar.
5.1 Asset beta of REITs and C-Corps

Figure 3 plots average daily asset betas for REITs
and C-Corps over the period 2000–2015. A visual
examination of the figure shows that the average
REIT asset beta is less than the average C-Corp
asset beta over the entire time period and during
the financial crisis. This result is confirmed by the
t-tests of hypotheses Hypothesis 1a and Hypothesis 2a provided in Table 2. Specifically, both in crisis and out of crisis the differences are statistically
and economically significant. Over the entire time
period, the average C-
Corp asset beta is 75.8%
larger ((0.823−0.468)/0.468) than the average REIT.
Although asset betas for both subsectors increase
during the financial crisis, the relative magnitudes
of the two sectors’ operating risk remain similar.
During the financial crisis, the average asset beta
for C-Corps was 66.1% larger ((0.912−0.549)/0.549)
than the average REIT asset beta. The similarity in
this relationship in-crisis versus otherwise is striking. If the inherent operating risk of a REIT exceeds
that of a C-Corp (Eyster and deRoos, 2009), then

Figure 3. Asset betas for REITs versus C-Corps (2000–2015).
Note: Annual adjustment based on market value of equity and book value of long-term debt as of December 31 of previous
year.
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Table 2.

Asset Betas for REITs vs C-Corps (2000–2015)

t-test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances
1/1/2000
REITs
Mean
Variance
Observations
t-stat
Wilcoxon Signed Rank test

0.468
0.038
4,025
70.325
97.641

12/31/2015
C-Corps
0.823
0.064
4,025
***
+++

6/1/2008
REITs

10/31/2010
C-Corps

0.549
0.022
610
45.378
42.782

0.912
0.017
610
***
+++

*** Significant at the 0.001 level or better, in a two-tailed t-test that assumes unequal variances.
+++ Significant at the 0.001 level or better.
Note: The conclusion that REIT asset beta is much lower than C-Corp asset beta is robust to different assumptions regarding C-Corp tax rates.
The above results assume that REITs face a 0% tax rate and C-Corps face a 34% corporate tax rate. If we assume that both REITs and C-Corps
face the same, 0%, tax rate results in average C-Corp asset beta of 0.6541, which is still 40% higher than the average asset beta for REITS.

this result implies that management contracts shift
operating risk from the REIT to the C-Corp and
that this shift occurs in all states of the economy.
5.2 Equity betas of REITs and C-Corps

Figure 4 plots average daily equity betas for REITs
and C-Corps over the period 2000–2015. A visual
examination of Figure 4 suggests that C-
Corp
equity betas exceed the equity betas of REITs, with
the exception of the global financial crisis, when
REIT equity betas exceeded C-Corp equity betas.
This analysis is confirmed by the statistical tests
in Table 3. A t-test of the null hypothesis that the
average equity beta of the two groups is the same
(Hypothesis 1b) is rejected. Over the sample period,
the average equity beta for C-Corps is 8.5% larger
((1.116−1.021)/1.021) than the average equity beta
for REITs. Thus, an equity investment in REITs is
less risky than is an equity investment in C-Corps.
In contrast, using a shorter time period that is more

heavily influenced by the financial crisis, Kim and
Jang (2012) conclude that there is no difference in
the market risk of the two subsectors. This difference in the two groups’ equity betas is much smaller
than is the average difference in the two groups’ asset
betas. One interpretation of the combined results is
that management contracts shift business risk from
REITs to C-Corps. REITs then offset their lower
business risk with higher financial leverage.
This higher financial leverage negatively impacted
REITs during the global financial crisis, due to a
proportionately larger decline in equity in response
to falling asset prices. As we see in Figure 2, REITs
experienced a proportionately larger increase in
financial leverage than C-
Corps. A t-
test of the
mean differences in equity betas during the financial crisis (Hypothesis 2b) rejects the null hypothesis
that there is no difference in the equity risk of the
two subsectors. Average REIT equity betas during
the crisis are 20.5% larger ((1.856−1.540)/1.540)
than average C-Corp equity betas. Thus, the crisis

Figure 4. Equity betas for REITs versus C-Corps (2000–2015).
Note: CAPM-based beta calculation, on a daily basis with a 255-day estimation window.
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CAPM equity betas for REITs versus C-Corps
1/1/2000
REITs

Mean
Variance
Observations
t-test
Wilcoxon Signed Rank test

1.021
0.258
4,025
9.696
28.925

12/31/2015
C-Corps
1.116
0.13
4,025
***
+++

6/1/2008
REITs
1.856
0.12
610
−19.322
−42.782

10/31/2010
C-Corps
1.54
1.54
610
***
+++

*** Significant at the 0.001 level or better, in a two-tailed t-test that assumes unequal variances.
+++ Significant at the 0.001 level or better.

CAPM. There is no asset beta analog for the three-
factor model, so we do not present formal hypothesis tests.
Results from the three-
factor estimation are
presented in Table 4. As do Kim and Jang (2012),
we find that for both C-Corps and REITs, each of
the three factors explains returns. Consistent with
the results reported in Table 3, the coefficient on
the market factor estimated for C-Corps (REITs)
is higher (lower) than the coefficient for REITs
(C-Corps) for the complete period (financial crisis
period). In addition, the coefficients on the firm size

resulted in an anomalous period during which an
equity investment in a REIT was riskier than an
equity investment in a C-Corp.
5.3 Sensitivity analysis

In this section we examine the sensitivity of our
equity beta results to use of the Fama-French (1993)
three-
factor model rather than the CAPM. The
three-factor model was developed in response to the
fact that small and value companies had persistently
higher returns than could be explained by the
Table 4. Fama-French Three-Factor Results
Panel A. FF-3 Beta one results (the market beta)
1/1/2000
REITs
Mean
Variance
Observations
t-stat
Wilcoxon Signed Rank test

12/31/2015
C-Corps

6/1/2008
REITs

10/31/2010
C-Corps

1.048
0.051
***
+++

−1.477
0.164
610
−12.1462
−28.662

1.264
0.024
610
***
+++

12/31/2015
C-Corps

6/1/2008
REITs

10/31/2010
C-Corps

0.581
0.104
***
+++

1.163
0.073
610
−8.385
−15.016

1.042
0.054
610
***
+++

12/31/2015
C-Corps

6/1/2008
REITs

10/31/2010
C-Corps

0.958
0.119
610
0
830
−16.991
−37.001

0.699
0.022
610

0.931
0.133
4,025
17.257
102.213

Panel B. FF-3 Beta two results (small/big portfolios)
1/1/2000
REITs
Mean
Variance
Observations
t-stat
Wilcoxon Signed Rank test

0.604
0.115
4,025
−3.105
−8.209

Panel C. FF-3 Beta three results (high book/low book portfolios)
1/1/2000
REITs
Mean
Variance
Observations
Hypothesized mean difference
Df
t-stat
Wilcoxon Signed Rank test

0.472
0.156
4,025
0
7984
−18.058
−109.893

0.319
0.13
4,025
0
***
+++

***
+++

*** Significant at the 0.001 level or better, in a two-tailed t-test that assumes unequal variances.
+++ Significant at the 0.001 level or better.
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and book-market factors are larger for REITs than
for C-Corps. Inferences about overall model fit are
similar to those in Kim and Jang (2012).
6.0 Summary and conclusions
In this paper, we use asset betas and equity betas
over the period January 2000 through December
2015 to investigate the asset beta and equity beta risk
of hotel industry REITs and C-Corps. We conclude
that, over our sample period, the average asset beta
of hotel C-Corps exceeds that of hotel REITs implying that C-Corps bear greater operating risk. We
also find that, on average over our sample period,
the equity betas of C-Corps exceed those of REITs,
implying that the combined operating and financial
risk of C-Corps exceeds that of REITs. However, the
difference between the average equity beta risk of
the two sectors is much smaller than is the difference in the operating risk between the two hotel sectors, consistent with REITs having higher financial
leverage due to their tax-advantaged position.
We also find that during the global financial crisis, operating risk increases by modest amounts in
both hotel industry subsectors, and the amount by
which C-Corp asset betas exceed REIT asset betas is
roughly proportionate to that observed in non-crisis
periods. During the financial crisis, however, REITs
experienced a greater increase in financial leverage
than did C-Corps, with the result being that the normal relation reverses. I.e., during the global financial
crisis, the combined operating and financial risk of
REITs, as measured by their equity betas, significantly exceeded the average equity betas of C-Corps.
These results suggest a nuanced view of risk allocation in the hotel industry. On the one hand, for the
firms in our sample, management contracts between
hotel REITs and hotel C-
Corps allocate greater
operating risk to C-Corps than to REITs. This is
consistent with arguments by analysts such as Latter and O-Brien (2007), who conclude that the total
return of all parties to a hotel management contract
is maximized if the management contract allocates
greater operating risk to C-Corps than to REITs,
thereby allowing REITs to make optimal use of their
tax-advantaged status through high financial leverage. On the other hand, our results are also consistent with analysis of Eyster and deRoos (2009), who
argue that C-Corps have greater bargaining power
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than REITs. Their greater bargaining power may
explain why hotel C-Corps fared better during the
financial crisis than operating companies in other
segments of the REIT industry, e.g., food and beverage Opcos and healthcare Opcos.
Of course, an alternative explanation for hotel
C-Corps relative strength during the financial crisis is that the source of hotel C-Corps bargaining power—their brands—allowed them to better
whether the financial crisis. We leave exploration of
the explanation for hotel C-Corps’ relative strength
during the financial crisis to future research.
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